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I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided Washing-

ton v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation,1 a
* B.A., University of Montana; J.D., University of Colorado; Mr. Fredericks is a member of the Three Affiliated Tribes, Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, North Dakota. He is
an Associate with the firm of Fredericks & Pelcyger, Boulder, Colorado. The firm represents
various Indian interests throughout the country.
1. 447 U.S. 134 (1980).
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case involving the right of states to tax the on-reservation sales of
cigarettes sold through tribally-owned smokeshops. The Tribes in
Colville were in the business of selling cigarettes free of state tax
at retail and wholesale levels.2 The revenues generated by the
Tribes were used to fund essential government services. 3 The
Court ruled that the state had concurrent authority to tax on-reservation tribal cigarette sales to the extent such sales were made to
non-members of the tribe.4
Colville was factually similar to Moe v. Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation,5 which the Court
had decided four years before. The state tobacco taxing schemes in
both Moe and Colville were nearly identical. In Moe, however, the
state sought to impose a cigarette tax on sales by smokeshops operated by individual tribal members and located on leased trust
lands within the reservation.' The Court in Moe upheld the tax,
insofar as sales to non-Indians were concerned, since the legal incidence of the tax fell on the non-Indian purchaser.
Moe established that a state may sometimes impose a nondiscriminatory tax on non-Indian customers of Indian retailers doing
business on the reservation, even if it seriously disadvantages or
eliminates the Indian retailers' business with non-Indians. Moreover, Moe also held that states could impose at least minimal burdens on the Indian retailer to aid in enforcing and collecting the
tax.8
An issue left open in Moe, which the Court addressed in Colville, was the legality of a tribal tax upon the on-reservation sales
of cigarettes to Indians and non-Indians alike. The Colville tribal
taxing scheme was different from the state's, and its smaller tax
allowed for sales at lower prices to consumers.' The revenues
raised by the Colville Tribes through the taxes, as well as the
Tribes' direct participation in wholesale and retail sales, were used
by the Tribes to pay for "essential governmental services, including programs to combat severe poverty and underdevelopment at
the reservations.""0 Thus, the extent of the tribal government's involvement in the cigarette sales and financial dependence on the
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id. at 144-45.
Id. at 154.
Id. at 159.
425 U.S. 463 (1976).
Id. at 467.
Id. at 475-81; cf. Colville, 447 U.S. at 150-51.
Moe, 425 U.S. at 481-83.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 144-45.
Id. at 154.
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overall scheme was much greater in Colville than it had been in
Moe. Moreover, in Colville the state's collection requirements imposed more stringent burdens upon the tribal retailer than in
Moe."
Although the Colville Court upheld the tribal tax, it extended
Moe and held that the state could concurrently impose its own cigarette tax on on-reservation purchases by non-members. 2 Thus,
the economic advantage created by the Tribes' overall scheme was
destroyed.' 3 In so holding, the Court was primarily concerned with
denying the Tribes the right to gain a competitive advantage
through what the Court characterized as "marketing their tax exemptions."' 4 The Court denied the Tribes' assertion of the right to
create such an advantage by imposing their own less burdensome
taxes or otherwise earning revenues by directly participating in the
reservation enterprise. The Court reasoned that if such an assertion were accepted, the Tribes could conceivably impose a nominal
tax and open chains of discount stores at reservation borders, selling goods of all descriptions at deep discounts and drawing customers from surrounding areas.' 5 Perceiving this to be a great evil,
the Court unequivocally stated:
We do not believe that principles of federal Indian law, whether
stated in terms of pre-emption, tribal self-government, or otherwise, authorize Indian tribes thus to market an exemption from
state taxation to persons who would normally do their business
elsewhere. 6
Lower courts have adopted this "marketing exemptions" concept
in determining whether to permit state regulation of on-reservation tribal activities to the extent such activities involve nonmembers.' 7
This article examines the effect of Colville's marketing exemptions concept upon traditional views of the law with respect to
state regulation in Indian Country. More specifically, this article
11. Id. at 151-52.
12. Id. at 161. Non-members included both non-Indians and non-tribal members. This
was another issue not addressed in Moe. Id. at 160-61.
13. See id. at 154-59.
14. Id. at 157.
15. Id. at 155.
16. Id.
17. See Penobscot Nation v. Stilphen, 461 A.2d 478 (Me. 1983); Squaxin Island Tribe
v. Washington, 781 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1986); Queets Band of Indians v. Washington, 765
F.2d 1399 (9th Cir. 1985); Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, 783
F.2d 900 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); State ex. rel. May v. Seneca-Cayuga
Tribe, 711 P.2d 77 (Okla. 1985).

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 1989

3

Montana Law Review, Vol. 50 [1989], Iss. 1, Art. 3

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

critically analyzes the effect of the marketing exemptions concept
upon fundamental principles of inherent tribal sovereignty, as well
as upon current federal policies promoting tribal self-determination, economic development, and self-sufficiency. Its conclusion is
that Colville's marketing exemptions concept, used as a mechanism to allow state regulation on Indian reservations, seriously undermines both the workings of tribal government and the fulfillment of the above-mentioned federal policies.
Part II of this article discusses general principles which affect
state regulation in Indian Country, from the traditional rules up
through the modern trend, and attempts to establish an analytical
framework from which to approach the issue of state regulation.
Part III critically analyzes Colville's marketing exemptions
concept, questioning whether the concept is consistent with the
fundamental principles controlling the issue of state regulatory authority on Indian reservations. The premise of this article is that
Colville's marketing exemptions concept is contrary to both traditional notions of tribal sovereignty *and federal policies of tribal
self-determination, economic development and self-sufficiency. The
marketing exemptions concept therefore should be abandoned as a
factor in determining the extent to which state regulatory laws can
be imposed in Indian Country.
Finally, Part IV offers an alternative approach whereby courts
can more consistently analyze the issue of state regulation in Indian Country. In essence, the proposed alternative advocates establishing an analytical framework within which courts can make
their particularized inquiry into the nature of the federal, tribal,
and state interests at stake. To guide this inquiry, the following
alternative legal test is offered: If the on-reservation activity which
the state seeks to regulate furthers the fulfillment of established
federal Indian policy, or involves the exercise of a traditional governmental function, then any asserted state regulation that would
frustrate or inhibit that tribal activity is barred, absent the state's
showing a compelling governmental interest in regulating nonmembers involved in the tribal activity. In addition to requiring
this showing of a compelling governmental interest, the state
should also be required to show that the means by which it asserts
regulatory authority over the reservation is narrowly tailored, so as
to impose a minimal burden upon the tribe.
Adoption of this approach would result in more consistent rulings by courts, and rulings more in tune with fundamental principles of Indian law in this area. This extension of the legal analysis
would also lead to more certain results, and allow all parties to be
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more assured of their legal position at the outset, without having
to involve themselves in jurisdictional litigation.

II.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING STATE REGULATION IN INDIAN
COUNTRY

A.

The Traditional Rule: Worcester v. Georgia

The issue of whether and to what extent states have jurisdiction over Indian tribes and their territory has long been a complex
and at times confusing area of federal Indian law. From the beginning of this nation's existence, states have attempted to assert authority over tribal territory when it served their interest.' 8 As a
result, the United States Supreme Court entered the picture at an
early date, establishing traditional rules which continue to shape
the Court's outlook to this day. It is appropriate then, to start with
the case that first established these traditional principles.
In 1832, the United States Supreme Court handed down a
landmark decision in Worcester v. Georgia.'" The case involved
Georgia's assertion of jurisdiction over two white missionaries who
were living and working within Cherokee tribal territory with the
consent of tribal and federal authorities. The dispute arose when
the missionaries refused to conform to Georgia laws governing Indian affairs. The missionaries were subsequently jailed by state authorities, and brought a writ of habeas corpus challenging the jurisdiction of the state.2 0 In an opinion by Chief Justice Marshall,
the Court held that Georgia had no authority to imprison the two
missionaries, 2 concluding that state law generally is not applicable
to Indian affairs within the territory of an Indian tribe absent the
consent of Congress.22 The Court has repeatedly affirmed the
23
Worcester decision.
The Worcester decision was based upon two principles. First,
the Constitution delegated to the federal government exclusive,
broad legislative authority over Indian affairs; and second, the
Cherokee treaties reserved tribal self-government free of state in18. See e.g., Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1866); The
New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1866); Lattimer v. Poteet, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 4

(1840).
19. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
20. Id. at 515-16.
21. Id. at 562-63.
22. Id. at 561; see also F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 259 (1982 ed.).
23. E.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); McClanahan v. Arizona
State Tax Comm'n., 411 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1973); Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 218-19
(1959).
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terference within Cherokee territory.2 4 There were thus two barriers to state authority at work: tribal sovereignty and federal
supremacy. Both concepts have developed to become separate and
independent barriers to the assertion of state jurisdiction in Indian
Country.2 5
B.

The Concept of Inherent Tribal Sovereignty and the
Limiting Federal-TribalRelationship

Indian tribes have long been recognized as distinct, independent, political communities, with the power of self-government
over both their members and their territory.2 6 This power of selfgovernment stems not from any delegation of powers, but rather
from an early acknowledgment by foreign nations coming to the
new world that the various Indian tribes were distinct political entities. This independent basis for tribal power has been the basis
for holding, for example, that Indian tribes are not subject to the
requirements of the United States Constitution.2 s
Although tribes possess attributes of inherent sovereignty over
their members and their territory, this sovereignty is of a unique
and limited character.2 9 Inherent tribal sovereignty is unique in
that it is limited by the federal-tribal relationship, a relationship
premised upon broad, but not unlimited, federal constitutional
power over Indian affairs.3 0 This federal power is often described
as "plenary."3 1 Thus, by submitting to the power and protection of
the United States Government, Indian tribes necessarily gave up
some attributes of their sovereignty.32 From the earliest cases,
tribes have been described by the Supreme Court as "domestic dependent nations," 33 dependent upon the United States for their
protection. 3 As a result of this status, the inherent sovereignty of
24. See COHEN, supra note 22, at 260.
25. See White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980).
26. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S.
(6 Pet.) 515 (1832); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Iowa Mutual Insurance
Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
27. See McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543.
28. Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
29. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313.
30. See COHEN, supra note 22 at 207.
31. Id.
32. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); See also United States
v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
33. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
34. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375.
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Indian tribes is considered limited by the overriding interests of
the United States Government. 5 In essence, tribes still possess
those aspects of inherent sovereignty which are not withdrawn by
treaty, statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status.3 6
Congress has limited inherent tribal sovereignty through the
enactment of various statutes such as the Major Crimes Act, 37 the
Indian Civil Rights Act,3 and Public Law 280.39 The so-called inherent limitations upon tribal sovereignty have been enunciated by
the Court in several cases, dating back to the early 1800s. In Johnson v. McIntosh,4" the Court held that upon coming under the protection of the federal government, the tribes were subjected to federal legislative power, and as a result implicitly relinquished their
authority to deal independently with other foreign nations.4 ' Thus,
the sovereignty of tribes, though not extinguished by the tribes'
relationship to the federal government, was necessarily diminished
to a certain extent. In Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,42 the
Court held that tribal jurisdiction to try non-Indian criminal defendants was necessarily terminated by the tribes' dependent status as a result of their incorporation into the United States. "3 In
Montana v. United States, the Court held that the Crow Tribe
lacked inherent civil authority to regulate fishing by non-Indians
on non-Indian lands within the reservation when no important tribal interests were affected.4 6
The Court in Montana, quoting Wheeler, noted that the areas
in which implicit divestiture of sovereignty have occurred are those
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and non-members
of the tribe.4 These implicit limitations on inherent sovereignty
rest on the fact that the dependent status of Indian tribes within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States is necessarily incon35.
36.

Colville, 447 U.S. at 153.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323; Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208; see also Kagama, 118 U.S.

375.
37. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982).
38. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1982).
39. Act of Aug. 15, 1954, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1162, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1360, 1360 note). For a good discussion of the
limitations on inherent tribal sovereignty by statute or treaty, see COHEN, supra note 22, at
242-44.
40. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
41. Id. at 591.
42. 435 U.S. 91 (1978).
43. Id. at 208-12.
44. 450 U.S. 544 (.1981).
45. Id. at 563-65.
46. Id. at 564.
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sistent with their freedom independently to determine their external relations."7 "[E]xercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect tribal self-government or to control internal
relations is inconsistent with the dependent status of the tribes,
8
and so cannot survive without express congressional delegation."'4
The broad limiting language the Court used in Montana is thus in
conflict with its earlier test developed in Colville, where the Court
said that tribal authority over non-members is divested only when
its exercise is inconsistent with overriding federal interests.' 9
However, the Court in Montana did note a significant exception regarding the right of tribes to control external relations with
non-members on the reservation:
To be sure, Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on non-Indian fee lands. A tribe may regulate,
through taxation, licensing, or other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its
members, through commercial dealing, contracts, leases, or other
arrangements.... A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands
within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity,
the economic security, the
50
health or welfare of the tribe.
Thus, although tribes enjoy many attributes of inherent sovereignty, that sovereignty is not absolute. Indian tribes are better described as occupying a semi-sovereign status, a sovereignty limited
by the tribes' relationship to the federal government as domestic
dependent nations. 1
C. The Role of the States in the Federal-TribalRelationship
From the previous discussion, it should be clear that inherent
tribal sovereignty is limited only by the tribes' status and relationship with respect to the federal government. Tribes, being possessed of this inherent, albeit limited sovereignty, owe no alle47. Id.; Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 326.
48. Montana, 450 U.S. at 564.
49. Colville, 447 U.S. at 153-54; see Yakima Indian Nation v. Whiteside, 828 F.2d 529,
533 (9th Cir. 1987) (discussing the apparent inconsistency between Montana and Colville),
cert. granted, 108 S.Ct. 2843 (1988). The Supreme Court thus may clarify the inconsistency
identified by the Ninth Circuit in Whiteside.
50. Id. at 565-66 (citations omitted); see also COHEN, supra note 22, at 244-46.
51. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 1; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515;
Choctaw Nation v. United States, 119 U.S. 1 (1886).
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giance to the states and receive from them no protection. 52 Tribal
sovereignty, then, is dependent upon and subordinate to only the
federal government, not the states. 3 The Court thus held in
Worcester that tribes, as distinct political communities, occupy
their own territory, within which state law can have no force, except pursuant to the consent of the tribes themselves, or in conformity with the treaties or laws of Congress. 4
This traditional rule announced in Worcester has been somewhat limited by later rulings of the Supreme Court. When the regulation of on-reservation activities significantly involves non-Indians or non-members, the modern trend has been away from an
absolute prohibition on state regulation absent congressional or tribal consent." In such cases, the Court gives less consideration to
the territorial component of tribal sovereignty and is more inclined
to emphasize the interests of the state, allowing regulation of tribal
activities on the reservation ." This represents a significant departure from the long established principle of Worcester under which
the Court has jealously guarded the right of tribes to be free of
state regulation within their own territory. 57 The modern trend has
been to frame the issue in terms of whether the state action infringes upon the tribes' right to make their own laws and be governed by them, or is preempted by operation of federal law.5 a Both
52. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 515; Choctaw Nation, 119 U.S. at 1; Kagama, 118
U.S. at 375.
53. Colville, 447 U.S. at 134; Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
54. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
55. E.g., Moe, 425 U.S. at 463; Colville, 447 U.S. at 134; Rice, 463 U.S. at 713; ci. New
Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983); Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202.
56. The "territorial" component of tribal sovereignty has long been recognized by the
Supreme Court. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1; Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
The Court has recently reaffirmed the principle that Indian Tribes enjoy sovereign power
over both their members and their territory. Iowa Mutual Insurance Co., 480 U.S. 9;
Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202. Likewise, the Court has recognized that tribal sovereignty contains a
"significant geographical component." New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 335 n.18; Bracker, 448 U.S.
at 151; see also Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987). The majority in Colville, however, all but ignored the geographical component of tribal sovereignty.
57. See Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
58. Williams, 358 U.S. 217; Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145; McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164;
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136; New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324. In analyzing state regulatory jurisdiction
in Indian Country, it is important to distinguish the parties the state seeks to regulate.
Absent express congressional consent, the state lacks jurisdiction over members of the tribe
on the reservation. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); McClanahan,411 U.S.
164. Cf. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 215 (in "exceptional circumstances," states may assert jurisdiction over the on-reservation activities of tribal members)(citing New Mexico, 462 U.S. at
331-32). Depending on the circumstances, however, the state may extend its regulatory powers into Indian country to reach non-Indians or non-members, in which case the infringement and preemption analysis is employed. See Williams, 358 U.S. 217; McClanahan,411
U.S. 164.
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of these factors, tribal sovereignty and federal preemption, arise
out of the federal-tribal relationship.
In cases involving a state's assertion of the right to regulate
tribal activities involving non-members, though the Court gives
less consideration to the territorial component of tribal sovereignty
as a bar to state jurisdiction, it is still important in one respect.
The reservation boundaries signal a preemptive act by Congress
and Congress' intent to establish the reservation for the exclusive
use and enjoyment of the tribe, free of state regulatory
interference. 9
The modern rule was perhaps best explained in White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker,60 a case involving Arizona's attempt
to impose its motor carrier license tax and its fuel use tax on two
non-Indian companies operating on an Indian reservation. In analyzing whether or not to allow such state regulation, the Court discussed the inter-relationship of tribal self-government and federal
preemption in deciding whether states have exceeded permissible
regulation of reservation activity that involves non-members:
Congress has broad power to regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause, Art. 1,§.8, cl. 3 [of the Constitution].
This congressional authority and the "semi-independent position" of Indian tribes have given rise to two independent but related barriers to the assertion of state regulatory authority over
tribal reservations and members. First, the exercise of such authority may be pre-empted by federal law. Second, it may unlawfully infringe "on the right of reservation Indians to make their
own laws and be ruled by them." The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a sufficient basis for
holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the reservation or by tribal members. They are related, however, in two
important ways. The right of tribal self-government is ultimately
dependent on and subject to the broad power of Congress. Even
so, traditional notions of Indian self-government are so deeply engrained in our jurisprudence that they have provided an important "backdrop," against which vague or ambiguous federal enactments must always be measured."
Of the two "independent but related" barriers to state regulatory jurisdiction, the Court has relied more upon federal preemp59. See Bracker, 448 U.S. 136. Reservations may be established by treaty, act of Congress, or executive order.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 142-43 (quoting Williams, 358 U.S. at 220; McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172)
(citations omitted).
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tion to invalidate state laws. 2 In the modern era, the Court has yet
to hold state regulatory law invalid upon grounds of inherent sovereignty alone." It is apparent, however, that both barriers exist
independently of one another, and therefore it is proper to analyze
the effect of each barrier to state jurisdiction separately.
General principles of federal preemption do not really apply to
federal preemption in Indian law, and the Court has therefore applied a somewhat different analysis in Indian cases. Preemption in
Indian law must take into account the long tradition of tribal sovereignty, a comprehensive federal legislative scheme dating back to
the beginning of the nation, and extensive federal administrative
activity by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other agencies as
well."
In determining whether state regulatory jurisdiction has been
preempted, the Court employs a balancing test, weighing the interests of the state on the one hand and the interests of the tribes and
the federal government on the other.6 At all times, however, the
tradition of a tribe's sovereignty over both its territory and its
members must inform the preemption analysis.6 6 Federal treaties
and statutes have consistently been construed to reserve to a tribe
the right of tribal self-government, and the Court has held that
this tradition of tribal sovereignty must be used as a "backdrop"
against which the applicable treaties and federal statutes must be
read. 7
The tradition of tribal sovereignty, as well as the long and pervasive legislative and executive role in Indian affairs, has led the
Supreme Court to conclude in many cases that the federal purposes of Indian treaties and statutes are broadly preemptive of
state law, in many cases preempting the entire field.6 In order to
62. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. 164 (noting a trend away from the idea of inherent
sovereignty as a bar to state jurisdiction and toward reliance on federal preemption).
63. In New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324, the Court used language of infringement, but added
that federal law had a policy of promoting self-government and that the state's assertion of
regulation over the Indian reservation was also invalid on this ground. Given the federal
government's current policy of promoting tribal self-government, it would seem that the
infringement and preemption barriers have to a large extent become intertwined, such that
state jurisdiction which infringes on tribal self-government would also necessarily be inconsistent with the federal policy of promoting self-government. See Ramah Navajo School Bd.,
Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
64. See COHEN supra note 22, at 270.
65. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136; McClanahan,411 U.S. 164; Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458
U.S. 832; New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324; Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202.
66. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136.
67. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172-73; Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
68. See Warren Trading Post Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685 (1965); Central Machinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Ramah Navajo
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comport with the notion of tribal sovereignty, the Court has construed federal treaties and statutes broadly, and has rejected the
proposition that in order to find a particular state law preempted,
an express congressional statement to that effect is required. 9
Having thus rejected a narrow focus on congressional intent to preempt state law as the sole touchstone, the Court considers state
jurisdiction preempted if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected in federal law, unless the state
interests are sufficient to justify state jurisdiction. 70 Further, the
Court has indicated that concurrent jurisdiction is preempted if it
would "effectively nullify" a tribe's regulatory authority on the reservation, or completely "disturb and disarrange" a comprehensive
scheme of federal and tribal management established pursuant to
federal law.71
On the other hand, where a state asserts authority over the
conduct of non-Indians engaging in activity on a reservation, the
Court's inquiry into the relevant federal treaties and statutes has
not been dependent upon mechanical or absolute conceptions of
state or tribal sovereignty. Rather, in such cases, the Court has
called for a "particularized inquiry" into the nature of the state,
federal and tribal interests at stake to determine whether the exercise of state authority is preempted.7 2 It is at this point that the
legal framework ends and the ad hoc factual analysis begins. 73 And
it is beyond this point that the Court has, in employing this ad hoc
factual analysis, arrived at some puzzling conclusions. 74 That is
why there is a need to establish a solid legal framework from which
courts can engage in their "particularized inquiry." The legal analysis must be carried one step further, in order that courts may
reach more consistent results that are more compatible with traditional notions of tribal sovereignty and current federal Indian policies. Before offering such an approach, however, it is appropriate
75
to reexamine Colville in light of the principles discussed above.

School Bd., 458 U.S. 832; New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324; see also COHEN supra note 22, at 27579.
69. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144.
70. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 334; see also, Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 898, aff'd mem.,
108 S. Ct. 685 (1988)(state jurisdiction is preempted if it conflicts with the purpose or operation of a federal statute, regulation, or policy).
71. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 334.
72. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 144-45.
73. See e.g., id.
74. Id.
75. A summary of the proposed test is set out in the text, infra, at 78.
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III.

Colville's MARKETING

EXEMPTIONS CONCEPT AND THE

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING STATE REGULATION OF
INDIAN RESERVATIONS

After reading the Colville opinion, one is struck by the relatively short shrift given to the two barriers to state jurisdiction so
carefully emphasized in Bracker, which the Court decided later the
same year. In Colville, the Court seemed to take an "ends justify
the means" approach. That is, the Court first stated the end which
would ultimately be reached: prohibiting the perceived evil of allowing tribes to market tax exemptions from state law to persons
who would normally do their business elsewhere. 76 The Court then
proceeded to justify reaching this end by attempting to explain
how the application of the state cigarette tax to tribal sales to nonmembers was neither preempted nor was it an infringement on tribal self-government. 77 In stretching to justify its conclusion, the
Court imposed some serious burdens upon the ability of the Tribes
to plan effective economic development projects in their pursuit of
self-sufficiency. Had the Court paid proper heed to both tradi-

tional notions of respect for tribal self-government and the federaltribal relationship, as well as the territorial component of tribal
sovereignty, it would have been clear that a tribe's marketing of a
tax exemption from state law has little if any relevance to the
question of whether state law is preempted or infringes on tribal
self-government.
A.

The PracticalEffect of the Marketing Exemptions Concept

Tribes looking for ways to attract commercial enterprise to the
reservation by utilizing appropriate tax and regulatory incentives
will be hamstrung by Colville to the extent that the contemplated
tribal regulatory scheme is more beneficial to commercial enterprise than the state's scheme. Under the marketing exemptions
analysis, tribes are effectively forced to conform their commercial
regulatory laws to those of the state. Forced to conform by the apparent judicial policy against marketing exemptions, tribes are deprived of their sovereign ability to offer business enterprises a better alternative. The tribes thus lose an essential mechanism by
which to attract business to the reservation in hopes of improving
reservation commerce.
As a result, tribal government loses important regulatory freedom within its own territory. Tribal decision-making power is, as a
76.
77.

Colville, 447 U.S. at 155.
Id. at 155-57.
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practical matter, significantly hampered by having to consider the
regulatory interest of the state. Nullifying a tribe's authority in
this manner is surely an infringement upon the right of a tribe to
make its own laws and be governed by them.
The Colville majority did not believe that such a result was an
infringement because the Confederated Tribes are still free to tax
the sales concurrently with the state.7 8 Such reasoning completely
misses the point. An outside commercial entity looking for a place
to locate its business obviously will not establish itself on an Indian reservation if it will be subject to concurrent state and tribal
taxes. It is more economical to go outside the reservation to avoid
this double taxation. If a tribe is to have any chance of attracting
this commercial enterprise, the tribe will have to forego its right to
tax or regulate just to remain on an even keel with the state. One
would be hard pressed to imagine that Congress could have intended such a result. To the contrary, it is more consistent to say
that utilizing governmental tax and regulatory exemptions to further tribal economic development and self-sufficiency is exactly
what Congress intended. Such being the case, Colville's marketing
exemptions concept is out of step with current congressional
policies.
One might argue that allowing the taxpayer a credit on the
state tax to the extent of tribal taxes paid would nullify the burden
that dual taxation puts on reservation commerce.79 Such a credit
would allow a tribe to raise revenue through taxation without unduly burdening commercial enterprise. Moreover, in those cases
such as Colville, where tribal governments participate as wholesale
and retail sellers of cigarettes, tribes can impose the full amount of
the state tax (getting full credit), and at the same time cut their
wholesale and retail profit margins by cutting the price of the
good. Under such a scheme, tribes still hold a competitive advantage over states because, ultimately, the tribes can offer cigarettes
at a lower price.
Such maneuvering though, is really beside the point. Although
a tax credit may lessen the economic burden imposed on a tribe
and reservation commerce by the dual tribal and state tax, the fact
remains that a tribe is still deprived of its ability and right to con78. Id. at 158.
79. The Tribes argued for such a tax credit in Colville. The Court rejected the Tribes'
argument and upheld the state's refusal to give credit on the amount of tribal taxes paid.
Colville, 447 U.S. at 158-59. The sole reason given was that the Tribes had failed to demonstrate at trial that smokeshop business would be significantly reduced by a state tax without
a credit. Id.
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trol the taxation of on-reservation commerce. Under a system
utilizing tax credits, the end result will always be the same. The
taxpayer must always pay the amount of the state tax, whether
payment is to the state or to the tribe. Because the state has concurrent taxing authority, a tribal government can never utilize a
more lenient taxing scheme than the state.
B.

The "Value Generated" Limitation

The Court has qualified the marketing exemptions concept by
placing emphasis on whether the value marketed by the tribal activity in question is generated on the reservation by activities in
which the tribe has a significant interest."0 It is hard to see the
relevance of this "value generated" theory, at least as it has been
applied by the court, other than as a means of giving political justification to a rule that prohibits tribes from "marketing exemptions." Moreover, asking whether value is generated on the reservation in order to determine whether a state can tax therein
illustrates a judicial policy of economic isolation of tribes and their
attempts to promote economic development free of state interference. That is, a tribe's ability to regulate and promote on-reservation economic development free of state interference, under the
"value generated" theory extends only so far as those particular
tribal activities which involve value generated on the reservation.
When a tribe is prohibited from using its governmental exemptions
for purposes of attracting outside enterprise to the reservation, the
tribe loses many of the attributes of sovereignty with which it has
been clothed by Congress.
Such a judicial limit is a novelty in the area of intergovernmental relationships. Contrary to the Colville Court's reasoning,
states commonly utilize their governmental status competitively to
attract outside enterprise.8 1 Under the state sales tax schemes utilized in the United States, people can easily avoid one state's high
sales tax by purchasing their goods across state lines in a neighboring state with a lower tax rate or no tax rate at all. It would be
shocking to suggest that North Dakota could force independent
Montana retailers to collect North Dakota's sales taxes from sales
80. Id. at 155; see also New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324; Cabazon, 480 U.S. 202.
81. For example, the absence of a sales tax in Montana attracts many shoppers from
bordering states and attracts retail business to Montana as well. A similar situation exists in
New Hampshire. Nevada's liberal gaming laws attract people from all over the country. See
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 463.010 to 467.180. Additionally, Delaware's relatively lax corporate laws
offer an incentive for many outside enterprises to incorporate thereunder. See DEL. CODE
ANN. §§ 8-101 to -619.
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to North Dakota residents. Nevertheless, this is true of what happened in Colville. It is hard to reconcile such different treatment of
states and tribes given that both are considered sovereigns. Admittedly, tribal sovereignty is limited; but it is Congress' role to limit
it, not the Court's. Congress has not taken away the right of tribes
to utilize their sovereign status to attract commercial enterprise to
the reservation. To the contrary, current federal policies promoting
tribal self-government, economic development, and self-sufficiency,

2

strongly suggest that if states can use tax incentives to

attract outside business, tribes can a fortiori do the same. To hold
otherwise robs tribes of an important governmental tool with
which to accomplish these federal goals, and therefore undermines
the fulfillment of the stated congressional policy. Congress could
never have intended such an anomalous result.
Moreover, express congressional authorization to utilize tribal
tax exemptions is not necessary, contrary to the Colville Court's
assumption. The power of tribes to tax on-reservation commerce is
a fundamental attribute of their sovereignty.8 3 This necessarily includes the power to set tax rates, unhampered by state interference. It therefore follows that tribes should be able to utilize their
taxing power as they see fit, free of state interference, unless and
until Congress says otherwise.
In focusing on whether value is generated on or off the reservation in evaluating a tribe's interests, the Colville Court's analysis
seems to implicate a "value added" theory of taxation of the type
utilized by the European economic community. In essence, the

"value added tax is a multistage tax levied on goods and services at
each stage of production and distribution." 84 The value added tax
(VAT) differs from the lump sum type sales tax utilized by the
Tribes and the state of Washington in Colville. The VAT is fractionalized, or collected in bits at each stage of production, with the
sum of taxes imposed at each stage ideally equalling a lump sum
sales tax imposed at the retail level. In Europe, the total value
added to a good within any country is recognized as the value of all
work done on the good within that country. 5 The VAT is thus
founded on the idea of allocating a tax based on the value added in
each respective jurisdiction.
Viewed in this context, there is a significant inconsistency in
the Colville Court's use of the value generated analysis. To the ex82.
83.
84.
85.

New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 334-35.
Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
A. SCHENK, VALUE ADDED TAX IN THE UNITED KINGDOM
A. TAIT, VALUE ADDED TAX 19 (1972).
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tent the Court used a value added rationale to minimize only the
Tribes' regulatory interest, the analysis is incomplete. The Court
failed to ask the next obvious question; that is, how much if any
value was added to the cigarettes by the state of Washington? Presumably, the Court's use of the value generated concept should cut
both ways. If the Court had analyzed the interests of both the
Tribes and the state using the value generated factor, it would
have conceded that the Tribes' interests were in fact greater than
those of the state.
Obviously, the tobacco used in the cigarettes was not grown in
Washington. Nor were the cigarettes manufactured or packaged in
Washington. In fact, the Tribes did not even purchase the cigarettes from Washington distributors, but instead purchased all
their cigarettes from out of state dealers who were federally licensed Indian traders.8 Washington thus added no value to the
cigarettes which could justify its imposition of a VAT. The Tribes,
on the other hand, acting as wholesale and retail sellers of the cigarettes, did add some value to the cigarettes sold, through their
maintenance of inventories, marketing, and hosting transactions.
Yet, even though the Tribes added value to the transactions, as
opposed to none by the state, the Court still held that the state
could tax tribal sales of cigarettes to non-members.
Given this anomalous result, the utility of the value generated
concept as a means to determine whether one sovereign can impose
its tax within the territory of another is questionable. In reality,
the value generated concept, having its genesis in the theoretical
underpinnings of certain tax policies, has no place in determining
jurisdictional issues. The value generated concept might have been
relevant had the Court in Colville attempted to allocate tax revenues between the Tribes and the state based on a value added theory."' But this was not the issue. The issue was whether the state
had jurisdiction to impose its tax laws within the sovereign territory of the Tribes. In such a case, a one-sided analysis focusing on
where value is generated on the reservation is irrelevant.
The value generated concept is even harder to apply. It involves burdensome factual inquiries into exactly where and how
much the value of a particular activity is generated (whether on
86. Colville, 447 U.S. at 144.
87. The Court has recently entertained argument on the following question: "Does the
Commerce Clause require that an Indian Tribe be treated as a state for purposes of determining whether a state tax on nontribal activities conducted on an Indian Reservation must
be apportioned to account for taxes imposed on those same activities by the Indian Tribe?"
Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 106 N.M. 511, 745 P.2d 1159 (1988), prob. juris.
noted, 108 S.Ct 1466 (1988).
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the reservation or off) and how much value that activity generates,
as well as determining the extent of a tribe's participation therein.
Such an analysis can lead to inconsistent results. The Court itself
has acknowledged that "arriving at precise territorial allocations of
'value' is often an elusive goal, both in theory and in practice." 88
For example, suppose a tribe has a manufacturing plant on the reservation and manufactures and sells a good to the public, utilizing
the revenues to provide governmental services on the reservation.
Obviously, a certain amount of value is generated both on and off
the reservation. The tribe adds value by taking a number of component parts and making them into a finished product. The value
generated off the reservation is found in the component parts
which the tribe imports from various off-reservation manufacturers
and suppliers. In such a case, has sufficient value been generated
on the reservation by the tribe to preclude absolutely state regulation of sales to non-members? How does a court, or more importantly a tribe, determine how much value must be added to the onreservation tribal activity before state regulatory jurisdiction is
precluded? Making such a determination would involve extraordinary hair splitting and could lead to inconsistent results.
A good example of the arbitrariness of the value test can be
found by comparing Colville with California v. Cabazon Band of
Mission Indians89 involving California's attempt to regulate tribal
bingo. Citing Colville, the state argued that the Band was "merely
marketing an exemption from state gambling laws" by offering
high stakes bingo to non-members, and that this minimized the
tribal interests sufficiently to justify the assertion of state jurisdiction." In rejecting the state's argument, the Court reasoned that
the Band was "not merely importing a product onto the reservation for immediate re-sale to non-Indians."9 1 Instead, the Band
had "built modern facilities which provide recreational opportunities and ancillary services to their patrons, who do not simply drive
onto the reservations, make purchases and depart, but spend extended periods of time there, enjoying the services the Tribes provide." 92 The Court's reasoning, then, seems to place importance on
how long the non-members stayed on the reservation and whether
88. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 164 (1983).
89. 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
90. Id. at 219.
91. Id.
92. Id. The Court also noted that the tribal bingo games were more similar to the
hunting and fishing resort complex and tribal wildlife management scheme in New Mexico,
462 U.S. 324, in which the state's assertion of regulatory jurisdiction based on Colville was
also rejected. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 220.
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those non-members utilized tribal services. One questions the relevancy of such a distinction, particularly when the issue involves
the assertion of jurisdictional authority by one sovereign in the territory of another. Indeed, the result in Cabazon must have come as
a great surprise to the Maine Supreme Court, which had previously struck down a tribal bingo enterprise utilizing Colville's marketing exemptions analysis. 93 The Court in Cabazon undoubtedly
reached the right result, but because of Colville's marketing exemptions concept, the Court was forced to ,draw some very fine distinctions in order to reach that result."4
C. Colville Reexamined Absent the Marketing Exemptions
Concept
Had the Court in Colville more carefully applied the Bracker
test,95 without regard to the marketing exemptions factor, the
Court would have reached a different result. The state's authority
to tax the tribe's on-reservation sales of cigarettes to non-members
is invalid under Bracker because it is both contrary to current federal Indian policy and an infringement upon tribal selfgovernment.
1. Federal Preemption
It is clear that current federal Indian policy is dominated by
the promotion of "Indian self-government, including [the] overriding goal of encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development."" Congress attaches great significance to these federal
policies.9 7 The Ninth Circuit, in denying Montana the right to impose its severance tax on Indian coal mined by a non-Indian company, has required that the "firm federal policy of promoting tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development.

. .

be given broad pre-

emptive effect."' 8
When analyzing these important federal interests in terms of
93. See Penobscot Nation, 461 A.2d at 486.
94. A fair reading of Cabazon and the Court's discussion of Colville therein suggests
that Colville should be limited to its facts, i.e., allowing concurrent state jurisdiction only in
those cases where a tribe is participating in a commercial activity solely at the retail or
wholesale level and acting as a conduit through which non-Indians arrive on the reservation
with the single purpose of purchasing goods for less and immediately departing.
95. See supra, note 61 and accompanying text.
96. Cabazon, 480 U.S. 216 (citing New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 333-34).
97. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 335.
98. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 898. [See Note, Crow Tribe v. Montana: New Limits in
State Intrusion into Reservation Rights, New Lessons for State and Tribal Cooperation,
this issue.-Ed.]
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federal preemption, it is important that the Court realize the economic position of the tribes. Indian tribes typically have low tax
bases and are among the most economically depressed areas in the
country. As a result, tribal governments are many times forced to
resort to less traditional and more innovative ways in which to
raise revenue for essential governmental functions and services.
The tribal cigarette tax and sales scheme in Colville was one way
of raising governmental revenue. A Cabazon-type bingo enterprise
is another. 9
The fact that these tribal enterprises generate revenue to pay
for essential governmental functions and services is entirely consistent with congressional and executive policies promoting tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development, and should therefore
be given great weight. Courts should be reluctant to permit any
state regulation which would interfere with the promotion of these
federal policies.
Had the Court in Colville given proper deference to the applicable federal policies, the Court should have and easily could have
concluded that Washington's authority to tax the tribal
smokeshops' sales to non-members was preempted. The Tribes in
Colville were using the tax and sales revenues generated from the
smokeshop business to provide governmental services on their reservations. As a result of increased governmental revenues, the
Tribes depended less on federal money, thereby further promoting
the federal policies of tribal self-sufficiency and economic
independence.' 0 0
Allowing a state to tax a tribe's cigarette sales concurrently,
however, results in a loss of governmental revenue to the tribe and
thus frustrates the federal policies of tribal self-sufficiency and economic development. A proper respect for these federal policies requires the conclusion that concurrent state regulatory jurisdiction
is preempted because it interferes with the fulfillment of these federal and tribal interests as they are reflected in federal law. By
taking revenue that would otherwise go toward supporting a tribe
and its programs, and by limiting the tribe's ability to regulate economic development within its own sphere, a concurrent state tax
impermissibly threatens Congress' overriding objective of encour99. See also New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324 (tribal hunting and fishing resort complex);
Mescalero, 411 U.S. 145 (tribal ski resort); Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (tribal timber company);
Central Machinery Co., 448 U.S. 160 (tribal farming enterprise).
100. The President's 1983 statement on Indian Policy states that "It is important to
the concept of self-government that tribes reduce their dependence on Federal funds by
providing a greater percentage of the cost of their self-government." 19 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
Doc. (Jan. 24, 1983) quoted in Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 217 n.20.
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aging tribal self-government and economic development. The assertion of such state jurisdiction is therefore invalid.10 1 Moreover,
increased tribal governmental revenues generated by activities
such as the tribal smokeshops has the added benefit of taking pressure off of tribal governments to over-exploit their natural resources as a means of generating revenue.
The federal and tribal interests present in Colville were at
least as prevalent as they were in Cabazon. Yet, the Court in Colville failed to recognize the importance of promoting the critical
federal and tribal interests in self-government and economic
development.
In short, the tribal smokeshops in Colville offered a revenue
raising alternative where few alternatives were available. The
Tribes in Colville undertook an activity to raise governmental revenue under the authority of federal law. In such a case, any assertion of state authority which interferes with the accomplishment of
the federal purpose should be prohibited, absent a showing by the
state of a sufficiently compelling interest to justify its regulatory
jurisdiction.1 02
Outside of prohibiting the Court's perceived evil of allowing
tribes to utilize their governmental tax exemptions competitively,
the only real interest asserted by the state in Colville was its interest in raising revenue.1 03 However, the Court has made it clear that
a state seeking to impose a tax on a transaction between a tribe
and non-members must point to more than its general interest in
raising revenue in order to justify the assertion of its jurisdiction.1 0 ' In contrast to the state's interest in raising revenue, the
asserted tribal interests in Colville went beyond mere revenue raising. The tribal taxing schemes were also aimed at controlling economic activity within the reservation. Moreover, the revenues generated from the smokeshop sales and tribal taxes were a means by
which tribes could free themselves from dependence upon federal
funds, and thereby become more self-sufficient. The Tribes, then,
under the authority of federal law, were asserting a legitimate governmental interest in setting the tone for competitive economic activity within their own sphere. More importantly, the Tribes were
engaged in an activity designed to further the ultimate goal of self101. Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 902-03; See New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 334 (state jurisdiction is preempted if it interferes or is incompatible with federal and tribal interests reflected
in federal law).
102. See New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 335-36; see also Bracker, 448 U.S. at 143.
103. Colville, 447 U.S. at 157.
104. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 336.
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government. Had the Court in Colville given proper recognition to
these strong federal and tribal interests, consistent with established principles of Indian law concerning the state's role with respect to the federal-tribal relationship, it would have been clear
that the state's general interest in raising revenue was insufficient
to allow concurrent tax jurisdiction. The Court's emphasis on the
marketing exemptions concept blinded its judgment. 105
2. Infringement upon Tribal Self-Government
Not only did the state's assertion of concurrent jurisdiction in
Colville impermissibly burden the fulfillment of federal Indian policies, it also infringed upon the Tribes' right to make their own
laws and be governed by them. Specifically, allowing concurrent
state jurisdiction to tax on-reservation sales to non-members interfered with the operation of the tribal governments' revenue raising
function by undermining the Tribes' own sovereign authority to
regulate and tax the distribution of cigarettes on the reservation. 0 6
Clearly, "[t]he power to tax is an essential attribute of tribal
sovereignty because it is a necessary instrument of self-government
and territorial management. . . enabl[ing] a tribal government to
raise revenues for its essential services." 10 7 This power derives from
a tribe's inherent sovereign authority to control economic activity
within its jurisdiction and to defray the cost of providing governmental services by requiring contributions from persons or enterprises engaged in economic activities within that jurisdiction. 0 8
This inherent attribute of tribal sovereignty extends to tribal
members and non-members alike, and is the result of a proper recognition of the territorial component of tribal sovereignty. 1 9
The imposition of state regulatory jurisdiction in Colville had
the effect of injecting state law into an on-reservation transaction
which the Tribes had made subject to their own laws. 1 Allowing
the state to assert such dual regulatory jurisdiction on the reservation effectively nullified the Tribes' inherent sovereign authority to
decide for themselves whether and to what extent to regulate and
105. In contrast, the Court's emphasis in Cabazon was properly focused upon the fulfillment of the congressional goals of tribal self-determination, self-sufficiency and economic
development. Cabazon, 480 U.S. at 216.
106. See Colville, 447 U.S. at 165 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
107. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137; Kerr-McGee Corp. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
195, 201 (1985).
108. Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137.
109. Id. at 140; See also discussion of the territorial component of sovereignty, supra
note 56.
110. Colville, 447 U.S. at 170 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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control on-reservation economic activity. 1" Thus, where the state
is allowed to impose a concurrent tax on reservation commerce, a
tribe may be reluctant to maintain its own tax for fear that the
dual tax will drive away commercial enterprise. Such a nullification
of a tribe's authority to control reservation economic activity contravenes the principle of tribal self-government and should not be
countenanced absent an express congressional mandate to the contrary.1" 2 One is hard pressed to articulate a greater infringement on
tribal self-government than when one sovereign controls the regulatory freedom of another. Tribal sovereignty rings hollow if tribal
authority over the reservation exists only at the sufferance of the
state.
Moreover, authorizing the imposition of state regulatory law
on reservation commerce without tribal or congressional consent is
an improper judicial invasion into the sphere of tribal self-government. The Court in Colville effectively created a judicial limit
upon the exercise of inherent tribal sovereignty. Consequently, the
Court stepped outside its proper function and into an area traditionally and properly left to Congress. 1 3 It is for Congress and not
the judiciary to decide whether the federal government should so
limit the exercise of tribal self-government by allowing concurrent
state regulatory jurisdiction. The failure of the judiciary to exercise
proper restraint in this area raises serious questions with respect to
broader issues concerning the balance of powers under the Constitution of the United States. The Indian Commerce Clause gives
the authority to regulate commerce with Indian tribes to Congress,
not to the Court. Consequently, judicial law-making giving states
the right to regulate Indian commerce through taxation is constitutionally improper." 4
111. See Merrion, 455 U.S. at 137; New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 338.
112. See New Mexico, 462 U.S. 324 (state could not concurrently regulate hunting and
fishing by non-members where it would effectively nullify the tribe's own authority to regulate the use of its resources by members and non-members and would interfere with the
comprehensive scheme of federal-tribal management established under tribal law); cf. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223 (exclusive authority of Indian governments over transactions occurring on their reservations should not be taken from tribe absent governing acts of Congress
to the contrary); Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382, 387-88 (1976) (state court jurisdiction barred where it would interfere with tribal self-government by subjecting an on-reservation dispute between reservation Indians to a forum other than the one they have established for themselves); Santa Clara Pueblo, 436 U.S. at 59-60.
113. Authority over Indian affairs has been delegated to Congress under the Indian
Commerce Clause of the U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 18. See Kagama, 118 U.S. 375; Three
Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Eng'g, 467 U.S. 138 (1986) (absent governing acts of Congress, a
state may not infringe upon the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
governed by them).
114. See Pelcyger, Justices and Indians: Back to Basics, 62 OR. L. REv. 29, 41-44
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As mentioned earlier, the Colville Court attempted to justify
its holding by reasoning that regardless of the state's concurrent
regulatory jurisdiction, the Tribes are still free to impose their own
tax in addition to the state tax, and no conflict between state and
tribal law existed." 5 Again, such reasoning does not address the
actual problem. The fact remains that a tribe's own authority to
legislate in the same area is impermissibly burdened by having to
subordinate to the regulatory interests of the state. Moreover, the
imposition of a state tax upon on-reservation economic activity
forces a tribe to choose between imposing a dual tax, thereby discouraging economic activity on the reservation, or foregoing
needed tax revenues to pay for the cost of government." 's The tribe
is thus placed in an untenable position. It must choose between
two competing interests, either to encourage economic development by foregoing dual taxation or to promote self-sufficiency and
independence from the federal government at the expense of economic development. Denying the state concurrent regulatory jurisdiction in such a case would relieve the tribal government from
having to face this predicament. The tribe would then be free to
decide for itself the extent to which it wished to tax on-reservation
economic activity, without having to consider the burden that a
dual tax imposes on reservation commerce. At the same time, the
tribe would have enabled itself to generate needed governmental
revenues in the form of a less burdensome exclusive tax. The
power to tax includes the power to choose not to tax. The specter
of concurrent state taxation of reservation activity nullifies this
right and power.
In accord with fundamental principles of tribal self-government, the Supreme Court has "consistently guarded the authority
(1983).
115. Colville, 447 U.S. at 158-59. It would seem that this reasoning would be easily
circumvented by a tribal taxing ordinance that expressly prohibited any concurrent state
taxes as a burden on reservation commerce-thereby creating an inherent conflict-or
which otherwise provided that the economic burden of any state taxes paid by on-reservation taxpayers will be passed through to the Tribe in the form of a credit against the tribal
taxes for the amount of state taxes paid. In such a case, any concurrent state regulatory
jurisdiction would have to be preempted. See Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. at 836
(tribal entity contractually agreed to reimburse non-Indian contractor for any state taxes
paid); Bracker, 448 U.S. at 140 (Tribe agreed to reimburse non-Indian contractor for any
tax liability incurred as a result of its on-reservation business activities); Crow Tribe, 819
F.2d at 897 (Tribe granted a non-Indian company mining Indian coal credit against a tribal
tax for the amount of state taxes paid, resulting in the company paying no taxes to the
Tribe).
116. See Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana, 650 F.2d 1104, 1116 (9th Cir. 1981),
amended 665 F.2d 1390 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 916 (1982).
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of Indian governments over their reservations."'1' Colville and the
marketing exemptions concept represent a significant and unprecedented departure from this long established principle.
All of these factors lead to the inescapable conclusion that the
marketing exemptions concept is out-of-step with current federal
policies, as well as with traditional principles of Indian law, and
adds nothing but confusion to issues concerning state regulatory
jurisdiction in Indian Country. The marketing exemptions concept
must not be used as a judicial sword to pierce the heart of tribal
self-determination. If indeed the Court means what it says when it
lauds the concept of tribal sovereignty, it should permit tribes the
freedom they need to formulate the regulatory policies best suited
to achieve each tribe's goals. The only way to attain this necessary
step toward self-sufficiency is to abandon the marketing exemptions concept as a determining factor in states' authority to regulate economic activity on Indian reservations.
IV.

AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH

In light of the result in Colville, and the uncertainty which it
creates, there is a need to clarify current legal standards in this
area. The current legal analysis must be carried one step further in
order to establish a legal framework within which courts can consistently weigh the interests of the state, the tribes and the federal
government. The primary goal of the following proposed approach
is to provide the clarity necessary to enable tribes better to regulate within their own territory, secure in the belief that their activity will remain free from state interference, and without having to
engage continually in litigation to resolve asserted state regulatory
jurisdiction.
A.

Back to the Basics

In cases where the state asserts regulatory jurisdiction over
tribal activity on the reservation, the courts should always begin
with this traditional and basic proposition: Indian tribes enjoy sovereignty over both their members and their territory,"' a so117. Williams, 358 U.S. at 223.
118. See supra, note 26 and accompanying text. Presumably, the territorial aspect of
tribal sovereignty is just as important as the "member" aspect of tribal sovereignty. It would
be preferable, and more true to the dictates of the Indian Commerce Clause, to follow the
principle of Worcester, 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 561, that states have no authority on Indian
reservations until given such by Congress. Although the Court for the most part, with the
exception of Colville and Moe, adheres to this principle in cases involving only the on-reservation activities and internal affairs of the tribes themselves (Bryan, 426 U.S. at 376 n.2;
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vereignty limited only by the overriding authority of the federal
government."1 9 In cases such as Colville, involving on-reservation
activity in which a significant number of non-Indians participate, a
court should always begin with the Bracker rule, 12 0 recognizing the
two independent but related barriers to state jurisdiction. At the
same time, the Court must keep in mind the tradition of inherent
tribal sovereignty, as well as the federal-tribal relationship as a
"backdrop" against which to make its analysis.
In determining whether state regulatory jurisdiction is barred
by one of the two barriers of preemption or infringement upon tribal self-government, there is always one important consideration.
That is, a proper respect for the tradition of tribal sovereignty,
particularly its territorial component, as well as the federal-tribal
relationship, demands that a court not lightly infer the existence of
state authority absent tribal or congressional consent.
The Court should focus accordingly on the traditional notions
underlying the two barriers of preemption and infringement, and
should then proceed to make its "particularized inquiry into the
'121
nature of the state, federal and tribal interests at stake.
B.

An Additional Step in the Analysis

Up to this point, the proposed approach is not novel, but has
merely restated the legal framework as it has been developed by
the Supreme Court.' It is at the point of the "particularized inquiry" analysis, however, that an alternative approach is required.
Rather than employing an ad hoc factual approach in neutrally balancing the interests at stake, the Court should carry the
legal analysis one step further. In order to balance properly the
interests of the state on the one hand, and those of the tribe and
federal government on the other, and at the same time remain true
to traditional principles of tribal sovereignty, courts must give deference to fundamental principles underlying tribal sovereignty and
the federal-tribal relationship. Accordingly, courts should follow
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 170-71, 179-81; Three Affiliated Tribes, 467 U.S. 138) in those
cases involving the on-reservation activity of non-members, the Court has strayed from the
traditional Worcester rule (See Montana, 450 U.S. 544; Moe, 425 U.S. 463; Colville, 447
U.S. 134).
119. See supra, note 36 and accompanying text.
120. See supra, notes 61, 62 and accompanying text.
121. Bracker, 448 U.S. at 145.
122. The Court in Colville did not utilize the Bracker analysis in its proper framework, but instead employed an "ends justify the means" analysis, thereby undermining the
effectiveness of the approach so carefully articulated in Bracker. See supra, notes 77, 78,
and accompanying text.
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the process set forth below in analyzing and evaluating the barriers
of both preemption and infringement.
1. Federal Preemption
When analyzing whether state regulatory jurisdiction in a ColviUle-type case is preempted, the Court should not concern itself
with whether a tribe is marketing an exemption, or whether and to
what extent the value of the tribal activity is generated on or off
the reservation. Instead, the Court should make the following
inquiry.
First, the Court should determine whether the on-reservation
activity which the state seeks to regulate is consistent with the fulfillment of federal Indian policies, as evidenced in statutes, executive statements or treaties. If the activity promotes the fulfillment
of federal policy as reflected in federal law, the federal and tribal
interests are necessarily significant, and should therefore be protected from state interference. In such a case, the assertion of any
state authority over an activity that interferes with or frustrates
the fulfillment of the federal policies should be barred, absent a
showing by the state of a compelling governmental interest sufficient to justify its interference.1 3
One example of a state asserting a compelling governmental
interest in regulating non-members is where the questioned tribal
activity, in which non-members participate, violates the public policy of the state. In other words, the state might assert a compelling
governmental interest in regulating the conduct of its citizens
when they participate in an on-reservation activity that directly offends the established social and moral fiber of the state's public
policy, as expressed in its statutes. In order to make such a showing, the state would have to show that the on-reservation activity
so offends the moral and social values of the state that it could not
in good conscience allow such activity by its citizens. Thus, the
123. Requiring the state to justify its jurisdiction by showing a compelling governmental interest in such cases is not a radical step. In fact, the Supreme Court has hinted approval of the above requirement. See New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 336 ("[wlhen a tribe undertakes an enterprise under the authority of federal law, an assertion of state authority must
be viewed against any interference with the successful accomplishment of the federal purpose." Id.); Ramah Navajo School Bd., 458 U.S. at 845 (broad federal regulatory scheme
over Indian education precludes any state tax that "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress." Id. (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312
U.S. 52, 67 (1941))). The Ninth Circuit has also advocated a similar approach. Crow Tribe,
819 F.2d at 900 (if state coal taxes conflict and interfere with federal or tribal objectives,
court must review "the legitimacy of the state's interests, and the relationships of the taxes
to achieving those interests." Id.).
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state would have to show that the on-reservation activity it seeks
to regulate concurrently is absolutely prohibited, in any forum, as
a matter of public policy, under state law. A showing that the state
allows the activity in some forums, but not in others, would not
suffice. This example is intended to present a more strict standard
than the criminal prohibitory/civil regulatory analysis used by the
courts when there has been an express congressional delegation of
jurisdiction to a state."'
Additionally, in the absence of federal or tribal regulation, a
state may assert a compelling governmental interest in imposing
its environmental quality laws on non-Indian industry on the reservation in order to prevent environmental pollution both on and
off the reservation. In such a case, the state is filling a regulatory
void. However, in order to assert a compelling regulatory interest,
the state should be required to show the existence of a direct
threat to off-reservation environmental quality in order to assert
any regulatory jurisdiction. The mere fact that there is no tribal or
federal regulation of the activity would not in itself be sufficient to
justify an intrusion into the territory and jurisdiction of a tribe.
Further, suppose a tribe allows unrestricted hunting and fishing on its reservation. As a result, many non-members come on the
reservation to hunt and fish in the off-season, resulting in injury to
the fish and wildlife population, and a disruption of a fragile
ecosystem. In such a case, a state could assert a compelling governmental interest in regulating on-reservation hunting and fishing by
non-members in the interests of conservation and protection of a
common resource.
It should be clear that in order to assert a compelling governmental interest in regulating the on-reservation conduct of nonmembers, a state must point to more than its general interest in
raising revenues.11 5 Moreover, in those situations where there exists a federal or tribal regulatory scheme so comprehensive as to
preempt the field, a state could not assert a sufficiently compelling
governmental interest in concurrently regulating the same activity.
In such a case, any asserted state interest could not overcome the
overriding federal and tribal interests present.'2"
124. See Cabazon, 480 U.S. 207-15; see also, United States v. Marcyes, 557 F.2d 1361
(9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893 (9th Cir. 1980). As a practical
matter, federal law has preempted the field with respect to on-reservation activities which
violate the criminal/prohibitory laws of the various states. See, e.g., The Indian Country
Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1152 (1984); The Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1984); The
Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 13 (1984); Public Law 280, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1984).
125. New Mexico, 462 U.S. at 336.
126. See, e.g., Bracker, 448 U.S. 136; Ramah Navaho School Bd., 458 U.S. 832; New
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In addition to requiring a showing of a compelling state interest in cases where the tribal activity in question furthers the fulfillment of federal Indian policy, there is another aspect to the test.
That is, recognition of the strong federal and tribal interests at
stake requires that the means by which the state seeks to regulate
be narrowly tailored, with minimal burden upon the fulfillment of
the federal goals.1 17 "Minimal burden" means that if a tribe can
show that the state can achieve its regulatory goal through a less
burdensome alternative, then the state's asserted regulatory authority is not sufficiently narrow in scope to justify its allowance."' 8
2. Infringement
With respect to the infringement barrier, the approach is basically the same. In making its particularized inquiry, the court
should first ascertain whether the tribal activity which the state
seeks to regulate involves the exercise by the tribal government of
a traditional governmental function. 2 9 If so, a proper respect for
tribal sovereignty demands that courts guard against any asserted
state jurisdiction which undermines the tribe's own authority.
Thus, absent federal or tribal consent, concurrent state jurisdiction
should be barred unless the state can show a compelling governmental interest to justify its asserted regulatory jurisdiction. Moreover, the Court should again require that the assertion of such jurisdiction be narrowly tailored so as to impose a minimal burden
upon the tribal government's own authority over its territory.
As with the preemption test, a state could show a compelling
governmental interest in regulating the on-reservation conduct of
non-members participating in the tribal activity when such activity
Mexico, 462 U.S. 324; Warren, 380 U.S. 685; Seguando v. City of Rancho Mirage, 813 F.2d
1387 (9th Cir. 1987).
127. See Crow Tribe, 819 F.2d at 901-02 (state's interest, even if legitimate, could not
justify jurisdiction where not narrowly tailored to support its interest).
128. Although the Court in Colville offhandedly recognized that "the State may impose at least minimal burdens.., to aid in collecting and enforcing [the] tax," Colville, 447
U.S. at 159, the Court did not seem to address the possibility that there existed less burdensome alternatives than the state requiring that the tribe itself enforce state law. Id. at 15960. Requiring an examination of alternatives would ensure that the state regulation is sufficiently narrowly tailored placing as little burden upon the federal-tribal relationship as is
possible.
129. It is intended that the word "traditional" be understood in the context used by
the Ninth Circuit in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside, State of
California, 783 F.2d 900, 906 (9th Cir. 1986), aff'd, 480 U.S. 202 (1987), wherein the focus is
not upon whether the tribe historically engaged in a particular activity, but whether the
tribe is engaged in the traditional functions of most governments, such as revenue raising,
enacting zoning and automobile registration ordinances, and controlling commerce within
the reservation.
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violates the real public policy of the state and is criminally prohibited.1 30 Once again, any asserted economic interest of the state
would, alone, be insufficient to justify interference with the tribe's
interest in promoting self-government.13 1
In addition, a state may in some cases assert a compelling governmental interest in regulating the conduct of non-members on
non-tribal land in order to fill a jurisdictional void in those cases
where the tribal government itself lacks jurisdiction. For example,
a state could justifiably impose its hunting and fishing regulations
on non-members living on fee land within the reservation when the
1 32
tribe itself lacks such authority.
To summarize, the proposed rule from which courts would
make their particularized inquiry would be as follows:
Where the on-reservation activity which the state seeks to regulate is consistent with the fulfillment of federal Indian policy or
involves the exercise of a traditional governmental function by
the tribe, then, in the absence of congressional or tribal consent,
any concurrent state regulatory jurisdiction is barred, unless the
state shows that such jurisdiction is necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental interest.
Given the current federal policy of promoting tribal self-government, any state action that infringes upon the right of tribes to
make their own laws and be governed by them would at the same
time interfere with the federal policy promoting self-government.
In such a case, any time there is an infringement upon tribal sovereignty, federal preemption would necessarily follow. In this context, preemption and infringement are basically the same thing.
This may be one reason why the Court has not yet invalidated
state regulatory jurisdiction on the basis of infringement alone.
However, proper recognition of the concept of inherent tribal sovereignty mandates separate analysis of the infringement barrier,
even though in some cases the exercise would be only academic.
Given the pendulum-like history of federal Indian policy, there
may come a time when Congress adopts a less protective or neutral
attitude toward tribal self-government. If so, the infringement doctrine will take on its own importance as an independent barrier to
state jurisdiction, notwithstanding the absence of an active federal
policy promoting tribal self-government. This is one reason why
the two barriers to state intrusion in Indian Country, though cur130.
131.
132.
fishing by

See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
See Montana, 450 U.S. at 544 (tribe lacked jurisdiction to regulate hunting and
non-Indians on the reservation on fee land owned by non-Indians).
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rently so intertwined that they appear the same, should still be
analyzed separately.
C.

The Benefits of the Proposed Approach

The proposed rule, recommended as the proper legal framework within which courts should make their particularized inquiry,
would lead to more consistent results by abandoning an ad hoc
analysis in favor of a more logical and coherent inquiry. At the
same time, the proposal avoids temptations to adopt glib formulas
like Colville's marketing exemptions concept.
Not only does this proposal give proper deference to the territorial component of tribal sovereignty, but it also properly focuses
initial attention where it should be, upon the two barriers to state
jurisdiction and the history and tradition surrounding these barriers. This approach was all but shunned in Colville in order that
the Court might ultimately prohibit tribes from marketing tax exemptions.133 Moreover, the proposed alternative focuses on the
long tradition of tribal sovereignty and the federal-tribal relationship, and as such is more in tune with the traditional principles
governing state jurisdiction in Indian Country.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the proposed approach, by carrying the legal analysis one step further and establishing a solid legal framework within which to balance the respective governmental interests, leads to more predictable results.
Consequently, tribes would be better able to plan their own governmental activities, secure in the knowledge that the state may
not so easily circumvent their authority. The tribes would thus expend fewer resources on litigation, and could thereby devote time
and effort to providing for better tribal government.
V.

CONCLUSION

Colville's marketing exemptions concept, to the extent used as
a factor in allowing a state to assert regulatory authority in Indian
Country concurrently with the tribe, has no support among traditional principles of Indian law. It is judge-made law which, if carried to its logical extreme, poses potentially devastating problems
for tribes in their struggle for self-determination.
The marketing exemptions concept does not assist in resolving
issues of jurisdiction, and all but ignores the long and settled tradi133. If the tribe's approach were properly characterized as "utilizing tax incentives"
instead of as "marketing tax exemptions," the activity would seem much more acceptable,
and not as onerous as the Court presumed.
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tion of tribal sovereignty and the federal-tribal relationship. Moreover, Colville's marketing exemptions concept is out of step with
current congressional goals of promoting tribal self-government,
economic development, and self-sufficiency. In order to strive toward fulfillment of these goals, tribes need at least as much freedom and flexibility as Congress has given them. A proper respect
for the all important goal of tribal self-government demands that
tribes be given every opportunity to decide for themselves how
best to provide for their future, free of unwanted and burdensome
state interference. Colville goes too far in compromising these federal and tribal interests, all in order to reach the end of preventing
tribal governments from utilizing their legitimate governmental
status to further economic development. The marketing exemptions concept, then, takes from tribes an important stick in their
bundle of sovereign rights, a stick that, given current federal policies, Congress could never have intended to be lost.
For these reasons, the marketing exemptions concept cannot
exist concurrently with federal and tribal goals of self-government.
The marketing exemptions concept should be abandoned in favor
of the approach proposed herein, an approach designed to emphasize the strong federal policies of maintaining vital tribal self-government and to give added force to the fundamental principles
first announced in Worcester. Most importantly, the recommended
approach would allow tribal governments the regulatory freedom
they need to make their own decisions for a brighter future. After
all, this is the essence of self-government.
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